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Technology in Everyday Life: Conceptual 
Queries 
BERNWARD JOERGES 
AN ISSUE AND A THESIS 
According to Norman Macrae, an editor of The Economist, the world had 
produced, in the 40 years since World War 11, seven times more goods 
than throughout all history.’ This is well appreciated by lay people, but 
has hardly affected social scientists: they do not have the conceptual 
apparatus for understanding accelerated material-technical change and its 
meaning for people’s personal lives, for their ways of relating to them- 
selves and to the outside world. 
Of course, a great deal of speculation about emerging life forms in 
industrialised societies exists. And social scientists with a futuristic bend 
have projected their diverse visions upon public debates, ranging from the 
Efficient Hedonism of “post-industrialist” society i la D. Bell to the 
Responsible Convivialism of “post-materialist’’ critics such as F. Schuma- 
cher or I. Illich. Competing images of the coming “services society” or 
“self-service society” share a central concern: the changing relation 
between the spheres of large organisations and personal lifestyles, 
between salaried work and private consumption. They also share a certain 
implausibility: few people recognize themselves in either projection. And 
they share ubiquitous reference to “technology”, without accounting for i t  
in real terms. 
A good diagnostic of what is actually happening seems to me to be J. 
Gershuny, who sees a drift toward a particular type of self-service 
economy: a quite radical shift in the mode of provision of social services, 
as he calls it, based on new kinds of consumer technologies (1983, 1984). 
Industrialization used to be partial, but is becoming total fast. 
This process obviously has many facets. The one I am interested in here 
is the intrusion of modern technology into spheres of life which in the past 
have been relatively little dependent on it. To  be sure, the diffusion of 
technology into people’s lives outside the big work organisations has been 
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going on for some time. But the transformation of informal daily life 
settings into settings that are universally fitted with all kinds of technical 
installations and tools and networks and machinery is continuing in an 
accelerated fashion. The social sciences are clearly at a loss as to what this 
means in terms of changes in the structure of action and awareness of 
people undergoing these processes, beyond the changes in economic 
relations pointed out by Gershuny and others.' Recent theorizing on these 
matters is characterized by remarkable conceptual diversity, and by the 
same token considerable controversy regarding the social problematique 
of the technisation of everyday life.3 I will not talk here about the latter, 
but rather present a thesis concerning the inability of all such approaches 
to come to grips conceptually with problems that arise from technisation. 
And I will present a few ideas as to how this inability could be overcome. 
The thesis can summarily be introduced in three steps: 
(a) The social scientes have no concepts for dealing with technology 
because they have no concepts for things and tangible events in general. 
They have left the world of matter and tissues, the material-organismic 
world, to use Popper's term, to the natural and engineering sciences, and 
they have constructed themselves a world of actors devoid of things. 
(b) They have lost touch, therefore, with the process of modernisation, 
which cannot be understood without accounting for the way human actors 
and societies deal with the material world, how and why and with what 
results they transform material-organismic environments into artificial 
technical environments. This is deplorable not only because social 
scientists are constantly asked to advise in matters such as how to speed 
up the process of modernisation, or how to repair damages resulting from 
it. They also freely offer interpretations and pontificate about possible and 
desirable social futures. 
the way people construct their world and use their things; of the way, in 
A. Giddens' terms, society is produced and reproduced constantly. This 
applies to the social theories of those who manage and control and sustain 
the big formal enterprises of industrial society as well as to the everyday 
life-theories of people making use of technologies in solving their personal 
problems. So, social scientists may not be of much use, but they may still 
be quite influential. 
(c) This must not be so. The social sciences can legitimately deal with 
the material world and its transformations into artificial environments in 
their own terms. They can and should deal with technical artifacts much 
more systematically and indeed contest the monopoly of the natural and 
engineering sciences in explaining, and putting to practical uses, material 
processes. 
To a certain extent, their deficient social theories thus become part o f '  
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A PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATION OF TERMS 
In the following, the word technology refers to artificial things, and more 
particularly modern machines: artificial things that (a) require engi- 
neering knowledge for their design and production, and (b) perform large 
amounts of operations by themselves. This must be clearly understood, as 
it is by no means self-evident to reserve the term technology for machines 
and machinery, except in everyday usage. In fact it is a misnomer for 
machinery. The term refers, strictly speaking, to bodies of special 
knowledge about machinery, either in the sense of specific engineering 
knowledge, or in the more general sense of theories of engineering, 
analogous to theories of ~ c i e n c e . ~  In contrast to this then, “technology” 
refers here to technical things themselves, not to the scientific and 
engineering speech acts about these things, and also not human acts 
dealing with them, except those that are immediately required for 
machinery to operate. 
The next term, everyday life, is a difficult one. I will not use it with all 
the supercharges of meanings given to it  in phenomenological social 
psychology and sociology or in ethnomethodology, for example. I t  is used 
here to denote a type of action, or meaningful behaviour, which is not, or 
relatively weakly, f ~ r m a l i s e d . ~  “Formalised action” refers to action which 
is (a) regulated to a large degree by impersonal media, such as money, 
markets, bureaucratic rule, legal contract, technical norms, and (b)  
oriented toward some calculable criteria of “rationality” in the sense of 
efficient performance. Professional action is formalised, lay action is not. 
Working under contract with an employer is formalised, housework is 
usually not. Providing for one’s needs through the market is more 
formalised than picking berries in the woods. Driving a car through 
London is a more formalised mode of travel than wandering about the 
countryside. So there are activities governed by explicit rules, stating what 
is properly to be regarded as “rational” and what is not, irrespective of 
personal or social idiosyncrasies, and there are activities governed by rules 
of a different kind. I use the term everyday life as a label for the latter. 
The term social sciences will mainly refer to social psychology and 
sociology, not so much to economics or anthropology, which tend, at  least 
in part, to include material goods much more prominently in their central 
concepts. 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE WORLD OF THINGS: CONCEPTUAL BLIND SPOTS 
More than a decade ago, in a perceptive article titled “Psychology and the 
World of Things”, C.F. Graumann wrote: “Recently pyschology has come 
into contact with the world of things, an event which has produced some 
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theoretical embarassment” ( 1974, p. 389). He referred to developments in 
so-called ecological psychology which, at the time, seemed to him quite 
helpless about how to relate real-life environments to general psychologi- 
cal theory. And he went on to reconstruct the history of psychology’s 
failure to take into account the things that make up our daily lives, 
pointing out, for example, that the “goods”-character of things, the 
implications of a thing being owned, and by whom, has no place 
whatsoever in psychological theorising about the constitution of things in 
experience. He noted that for this reason psychologists could hardly enter 
into a fruitful discussion with a powerful tradition of social philosophy 
relating ownership to such phenomena as alienation. Indeed, much social 
thinking following Marx is based on certain assumptions concerning the 
mental and social damage wrought by separating ownership of capital 
goods from ownership of goods produced by them; of separating the skills 
necessary to produce things from the skills necessary to use them; of 
treating manpower as if it were a commodity, of treating nature as if she 
were raw material, to be appropriated freely. 
H, Linde, for example, has advanced similar arguments for sociology 
( I  972). According to him, man-made objects, “the institutional qualities 
of the behaviour patterns (Handlungsmusler) embodicd in things and the 
social consequences of their realisation” have been effectively “ostra- 
sized” by Weberian and structural-functional sociologies (p. 9). Grau- 
mann’s and Linde’s and other people’s argument here is, in the first place, 
that social psychologists and sociologists are unable, owing to the absence 
of concepts for things, to relate their theories to social philosophical and 
everyday interpretations of the modern predicament. I want to extend this 
argument and demonstrate, that the specific difficulty we have in under- 
standing technological change hinges on this more basic difficulty - to 
account, conceptually, for things. 
When I talk about things, I mean all kinds. Big ones, such as energy 
plants, cities, transport systems, oceans, in the extreme Spaceship Earth; 
medium ones, such as houses, trains, ponds, windmills; small ones, such 
as telephones, keys, pencils, microchips, in the extreme maybe electrons 
or radiating particles. Some may point out that making, e.g., a telephone a 
small thing is wrong, considering the telecommunications network it is 
part of, which in turn includes quite big things, such as satellite systems, 
not to speak about Ariane, the technical system developed to lift these 
satellites up into space. Or maybe an ocean is not really a big thing, 
because in practice it never becomes relevant as such, we never deal with 
it in its entirety. And this, precisely, is the point. We are quite unable to 
arrive even at a simple classification of things in terms of their scale - 
whether they are big or small - in a way that makes sense psychologically 
or sociologically. And yet everybody talks about the social problems of big 
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technology and the wonders of beautiful small things. So, nuclear plants 
are taken to be big, chips are taken to be small, even by engage social 
scientists - but on what grounds? 
It seems important to underline, that this critique of the “worldlessncss” 
of social psychology and sociology is directed at  the level of general theory. 
In all fairness it should be said that research in the many fields of applied 
social science does indeed deal with artifacts of all kinds. Industrial 
psychology, urban sociology, consumer and marketing research, the 
sociology of fine arts, research on the military, traffic, the police, handi- 
capped children, industrial design, community planning, energy and 
environmental conservation - all deal with material infrastructures and 
equipments and specific classes of objects, and with people’s interactions 
with them. I t  can be easily shown, however, that the concepts used for the 
material elements in these fields tend to remain external to their psycho- 
logical and sociological elements, and by the same token entirely unre- 
lated across different applied fields. 
The reason for this is that concepts for the material side of social reality 
cannot be derived from general theory, and therefore either remain ad hoe 
or are borrowed from relevant engineering terminology or from the 
subjects under study - workers or employees, doctors or patients, teachers 
or school children, bureaucrats or citizens, etc. If researchers wanted to go 
back to their general psychology or sociology textbooks, they simply would 
not find the stuff they deal with in their books’ indices. In short, the closer 
one moves to the sacred inner circles of theory-building and systematic 
empirical generalisation, the more devoid of things social science 
becomes. And the dominant paradigms in both psychology and sociology 
simply do not lend themselves to an integrated analysis of either man- 
nature or man-technology interactions. 
All this is not to say that conceptual frameworks allowing for this have 
not been envisaged. One would be, of course, Kurt Lewin’s, for many 
ecological psychologists the father of that discipline, presumably because, 
in his chapter 8 of “Field Theory”, he introduced systematic ecological 
concepts (1951). But I do not feel Lewinian psychology, read closely, could 
be considered a solution. Its concepts remained strictly intra-phenomenal, 
things exist as experienced by the individual person - in his or her social 
context, to be sure - only, and programmatically so. Lewinian life space 
remains, in other words, incapsulated and a bit ephemeral, without 
substance and even intersubjectivity. To quote Bronfenbrenner, “a world 
of imagination, fantasy and, indeed, unreality” (1977, p. 202) .  And Lewin 
strictly rules out. any possibility to link his concepts to concepts of 
sociology, economics, or geography. 
Another seemingly promising attempt was made by Mary Douglas, the 
anthropologist, in “The World of Goods” (1979). Here, things are indeed 
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given a constitutive role, however, in a quite one-sided sense. Goods are 
essentially “markers”, they serve symbolic and expressive functions. They 
signal to others the personal and social identity and location of the bearer. 
Goods only speak, so to say; they do not act, or sustain actions. It’s all - to 
paraphrase a famous title - about how things are used to do things without 
words. But things do more than speak. A washing machine or a central 
heating system or a car do much more than mark the social place of their 
owners. They do work, among other things, and Douglas & Isherwood 
hardly mention this, conceptually. 
The lack then of any systematic treatise of the psychology or the 
sociology of things is one of the reasons why applied fields, where things 
must always be dealt with for better or worse, remain theoretically weak. 
This has not always been so. Classical traditions in sociology and, as 
Graumann shows, to an extent in psychology, have given material things a 
very prominent explanatory role in the constitution of mental and social 
processes. To give, again, only two examples. For Marx, capitalism as a 
social form is constituted by a certain way of using things to control other 
people’s actions. Durkheim, in his “Rules of Sociological Method”, says 
that in order to understand social facts one should look at the material 
facts, or rather artifacts, a society is endowed with. Things are, in his view, 
social facts. 
Linde (1972)  has argued, that with the arrival of post-war social 
systems-theory such notions have been discarded very effectively, and a 
similar case could be made for cognitive psychology as well. Why this has 
happened is a matter for separate speculation. One may assume with 
Linde that one of the reasons was and is methodological purism. Including 
the material-organismic world in social and psychological analysis brings 
up all kinds of philosophical and epistemological issues which reigning 
philosophies of science have ruled to be solved either through elimination 
or through dividing them up neatly along disciplinary lines. Hence, the 
physical world became the world of physicists and biologists, and the 
world of actors‘became the world of social scientists, and the world of 
knowledge became the world of the philosophy of science. Each group 
relegated the world of the other, at  most, to the status of a mere 
environment, of their domains. 
Whatever the historical, and indeed social, in the sense of extrascien- 
tific, reasons, it seems that the social sciences have lost, somewhere along 
the road, in their concepts the domaine of things. Psychology has not only 
lost “the other”, i t  has also lost things. Sociology has not only lost “the 
person”, individual human agency, it has also lost things. And just like the 
rediscovery of the “social” in psychology, and of the (lay) actor in 
sociology, allows the two fields to converge in many senses, a rediscovery 
of the mental and social constitution and functions of things, particularly 
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modern things such as machines, will necessarily lead to more unified 
approaches. 
HOW TO CONCEPTUALIZE THINGS? 
The thing to do, then, is to start talking about things in the same 
conceptual terms we use for talking about people and the social process. 
We must, in other words, represent things, whether man-made or not, 
conceptually in terms of action. Things are linked with human acts in the 
same way other human acts are linked together. This does not mean that 
things are actors, no more than that people are acts. I t  means that we give 
meaning to the behaviour of things the same way we give meaning to other 
people’s behaviour, and that we expect other people to do the same. 
Things are partial acts, and they can represent almost any human acts. 
Represent means “stand for”: by symbolizing something, by substituting 
something, or by being a necessary part of something. If things are to 
represent actions, they must be integrated with actions, and I will use 
these two notions of things representing actions and being integrated into 
actions from now on. 
Talking about things in the terms used for talking about human activity 
(or passivity for that matter) can obviously be done in as many theoretical 
languages as there are theories or schools of thought in the social sciences. 
At the present stage it does not seem to matter much which language is 
used, as long as they are used at  all. Of course, one will get very different 
results depending on the language one chooses. Things will be conceived 
quite differently if one uses, for instance, social identity theory or some 
brand of Parsonian sociology, and so on. Marx used to talk about “the 
control things exert over us.’’ Schmalenbach, the German sociologist, has 
applied the categories of Tonnies - Gemeinschafi and Gesellschaji - 
to categorize things ( 1927). Mead, in talking about thing-constitution, 
speaks about children constituting, e.g., a bicycle by “taking the role” of 
the bicycle (1938, p. 109 f.), Elias in his treatise of Time refers to clocks as 
“normated events (Geschehenrabluuf) with recurring patterns . . . (serv- 
ing as) regulative and cognitive symbols” and exerting discipline (1984, p. 
vii f.), and so forth. I will not at  this point discuss the issue of choice of 
language. Rather, I want to point out three modes of representation of 
actions by things which should be made amenable to analysis irrespective 
of conceptual language chosen, in order to understand processes of 
technisation in everyday life. These are 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
technical and non-technical forms of representation; 
multiple representations and conflicting representations; 
representations in (professional) contexts of making things and in 
(lay) contexts of taking things. 
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Simplifying radically, one might say that all social psychological and 
sociological theories explain human conduct in terms of certain norms, or 
desired states on the one hand, certain types of knowledge or beliefs about 
the a’ctual state of the world on the other. It should be possible, in other 
words, to identify in most social science theories roughly equivalent 
constructs describing what is wanted of the world and what is believed 
about the world, and to show that social action or process is related to 
these, can be explained in terms of these. This granted, the basic 
paradigm for explaining people’s uses of things would, in a nomological 
vain, read somewhat like: “Whenever people want something (or are made 
to want something), and at the same time know (or are made to know) 
what a thing can do, they will integrate the thing in question into their 
action in such and such a way, and expect others to do so.” 
Marxian social studies, for example, are entirely focussed on two 
aspects of this paradigmatic notion: they elaborate the want-aspect and 
the be-made-to aspect of it. Marxian social theory is all about what 
‘happens to society and people, and actually to things too, when - in the 
interest of a few people - most people are made to want and made to know 
only very restricted uses of things. Or, one could say, it is mainly 
interested in how the power and right of access to things, particularly 
capital things ( ix .  means of production), are institutionalised in the 
interest of select groups. 
But the formula has, in the terms relating knowledge and belief to the 
use of things, and also in the terms refering to active use, other elements 
crucial for understanding technology and technical change. The following 
aims at an elaboration of this dimension and its juxtapositions with the 
first. 
MODES OF REPRESENTATION: TECHNICAL THINGS AND NON-TECHNICAL THINGS 
There is a class of things which is normally sufficiently characterized by 
the goals they serve or by the motives behind their use. A crutch is a 
helping thing, chains are dominating things, a badge or a cap are things 
for social identification. But there are other things that can be best 
characterised by their internal organisation, their mechanisms, and by the 
form in which these are linked with other acts. So we will say that a thing is 
perfect or crude, efficient or inefficient, economical or wasteful, etc., 
depending on its internal structure and the way i t  is linked with 
antecedent or consequent human behaviour. Cars may be fuel-efficient, 
clocks may be precise or imprecise, a washer may be economical or 
wasteful, as a function of its contribution to certain actions quite 
irrespective of underlying motives or goals. 
Monuments are power-things, pride in tradition-things, sometimes 
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hate-things to be bombed, but it makes hardly sense to deal with them in 
terms of efficiency or precision. Electricity plants are power-things too, 
but in a different meaning. I t  makes sense to look at them in terms of their 
efficiency, or in terms of their reliability in providing power to all kind of 
activities, (almost) without referring to moral purpose. 
I will now call things that mainly represent goals, values, purposes, etc. 
non-technical things, and things that represent mainly instrumental 
action, specific means-end-relationships, technical things. The goals 
non-technical things represent tend to be terminal values, to use 
Rokeach’s term; the means-end-relationships technical things represent 
tend to be more or less complex cognitive-instrumental activities linked to 
specific functional properties of things themselves6 A microchip embo- 
dies an enormous amount of highly sophisticated knowledge taken from 
all kinds of physics, mineralogy, logic; making it work within a computer 
represents yet other bodies of knowledge; and the chip actually working 
represents all kinds of information processing activities. Much social 
theorizing is concerned, in a roundabout way, with secular conditions and 
consequences of using nature and artifacts to represent terminal - if bad - 
values. In contrast, a social psychology and sociology of technology would 
in the first place have as its subject matter nature and material artifacts 
inasfar as they represent complex and sophisticated cognitive and organi- 
sational schemes for perfecting specifiable means-end-relationships. 
Obviously there is no such thing as technical or non-technical things per 
se. The question is whether things are de facto integrated in a technical 
mode into action or not. One and the same technical thing will always be 
integrated in a technical and non-technical fashion, will represent techni- 
cal behaviour and non-technical behaviour. But the technical mode will 
often dominate experience, and its deconstruction is peculiarly more 
difficult than the deconstruction of non-technical representations. A 
power generator is integrated in, or represents, technical action as long as 
it is kept running, or under repair to do so. Hence it  is a technical thing. 
When it is topped with a red flag, during a strike or at an opening 
ceremony, or when it is taken to the industrial museum, it acts in a 
non-technical mode, has ceased to be a technical thing. 
But usually dominant modes of integration are quite stable, and greatly 
stabilized by the overall contexts of meaningful action they are part of. 
And it may take quite an effort to disintegrate things from their proper 
place in our action patterns. It is not easy to look at a flower as a 
physiological machinery, and it is not easy to look at a toilet seat as a piece 
of art - at least in everyday life. Some people will never feel able to consent 
that mice are engineered into drug producing plants, and some engineers 
would rather see people killed than have their nuclear plant dismantled or 
made into a symbol of death. The deconstruction of representations and 
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the enforcement of incompatible representations may require or elicit 
great violence. 
In sum, technical things must be distinguished from non-technical 
things in the sense that they represent very different types, or modes, of 
action. While in both modes things symbolize, substitute for, facilitatr and 
stabilize, indeed make possible in the first place social interaction, the 
specific components or aspects of social life they represent are very 
different, and life forms change with changing integrations of things. 
Modern societies, as social life forms, are - among other things - very 
large and fast systems of action, due to the fact of integrating large scale 
and fast machinery. ‘‘Small” evcryday life technologies are almost always 
(more or less tightly coupled) peripheral elements of such largely out-of- 
awareness deep structures. The integration of even larger and faster 
technical systems and their expanding peripheries in modern life forms is 
made possible by the institutionalized process of knowledge generation in 
the natural and engineering sciences, and in this sense a social psychology 
or a sociology of technical change presupposes an understanding of the 
emergence and dynamics of modern science as much as it rests on the 
understanding of power and social conflict. 
MODES OF REPRESENTATION: MULTIPLE INTEGRATIONS AND CONFLICTING INTE- 
GRATIONS OF THINGS 
But of course the structure and tensions of social relations are always 
reflected in - and in turn stabilized or disrupted by - the ways technical 
things are linked to more inclusive action. Here the notion of simultane- 
ous, and conflicting, integrations of things as technical and non-technical 
can be usefully generalized. One and the same thing practically always is 
integrated in several different action patterns and in the action patterns of 
several different actors. No thing serves one person alone or all in the 
same way, and no thing serves only one purpose or represents only one 
means-end-relationship. Take a nineteen-year-old boy and his car: i t  
serves him as a means of transport, as a status-marker, as a source of 
fascination with things technological, as a retreat from home, as an 
instrument to express aggression, as pastime, as a repository for his 
personal hi-fi system. It  also plays a role in certain action patterns of 
parents, policemen, repairmen, salesmen, pedestrians, girlfriends, and it  
has already served previous owners, workers who produced it, engineers 
who have designed it,  shareholders, patent lawyers - where to end? 
The multiple representations, and in fact histories of representations, 
that constitute a car or type of car are not always compatible. Fascination 
with technology may promote uses that conflict with uses prescribed by 
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relevant regulations, sentimental attachment may conflict with the need to 
turn a car into money. 
Generally speaking, there are certain recurring types of incompatibi- 
lities in multiple or rival integrations, over and above conflicts bctwcen 
technical and non-technical integrations mentioned above: a) incompa- 
bilities between personal integrations, as in conflicts ovcr individual 
ownership or other rights and duties; b) incompatibilities betwcen col- 
lective integrations, as in distributional conflict over costs and benefits of 
technologies; and c) incompatibilities between collective and personal 
integrations, as in conflicts over individual rights to use tcchnologics 
which endanger others or over the legitimacy of collective rulcs imposing 
limitations on the uses of things Uoerges, 1979). In this view, conflicts 
arising from incompatibilities between technical and non-technical inte- 
grations are but special and often minor cases within these broad typcs of 
incompatibili ties. 
It can be shown that public controversics about the social installation of 
new technologies arise, as a rule, from all such incompatibilities. Much of 
current research on “the social shaping of technology” can be rcfor- 
mulated in these terms, even if it has little to do with the social shaping of 
machinery, i.e. the transfer of action onto technical things and its 
consequences. In  this sense, these studies do not deal with technical 
things themselves, but rather with the redefinition of non-technical, in thc 
last analysis moral, rules for the integration of te~hnology.~ 
It  seems to me then that the drama surrounding the progressivc 
transformation and substitution of technical for non-technical action 
made possible by the integration of machinery, with its requircments to 
submit large areas of behaviour to norms embodied in physical events and 
with its need to reassimilate technical action to non-technical ori- 
entations, is inexorably but quietly played out on thc back-stagcs. 
Accordingly, social research doesn’t take much notice. The battles around 
“choice” of technology, about access and ideological interpretation of 
technology on the other hand, played out prominently and at  times noisily 
on the forestages, chiefly affect the relative speed and thc schedules of 
technical integrations under varying conditions of power and conflict, not 
so much the direction they take and their universal consequences. Current 
research on technology is tuned in mostly on the battle noisc. 
MODES OF REPRESENTATION: MAKING THINGS AND TAKING THINGS 
A third aspect concerning integration of things, particularly technical 
things into action concerns the difference between the ways things 
represent action in the process of making them and in the process of using 
them. Again, this is a very crude distinction. Contexts of making things 
230 Bernward Joerges 
may range from dreaming up and inventing things, creating and, con- 
structing things, to copying things, assembling things, improving 
things, etc. Similarly, using things made by others may mean operating 
them, servicing them, playing with them, depending on them, be treated 
with them, etc. But most social science approaches to cope with things as 
constituent parts of human action fail to make this simple distinction. 
Psychologists studying thing constitution, for example, have always restric- 
ted their analyses to the issue of how given things are assimilated into 
experience.’ Historians and sociologists of technology have consistently 
looked at processes of invention only. Industrial sociologists have dealt 
with workers’ use of machinery without looking at how it was generated 
nor at what people do with the things i t  helps in making. 
One reason why the two perspectives should be mutually related is, of 
course, historical. Part of the process of modernization consists precisely 
in segregating and organizing separately the two types of process, both at 
the institutional and the personal level. In Marxian thought this has been 
interpreted as a means of social control and as a basis of alienation. 
Emphasis was on that class of particularly powerful things that are made 
to be used to make other things, the means of production. And, without 
having a systematic theory of things, industrial sociologists have long been 
particularly fascinated by the social history of the machine-tool industry. 
“From the machine-shops of a nation came the dies that are used to stamp 
or form nearly every mass-production item, from automobile fenders to 
soft-drink bottles - as well as the precision-machined goods of the old and 
new industrial areas, from tank turrets and turbine blades to disc drives 
for computers” (Fallows, 1984, p. I I ) .  Here is the prototypical industrial 
thing. But home computers to be.used to produce software for one’s own 
use partake of both contexts, too, and so do washers, cars or hi-fi sets. 
Another, closely related aspect is the very large difference in the types 
and kinds of knowledge represented by a thing-in-making and the same 
thing-in-use. Most of the technical things we use in everyday life represent 
relatively low-grade, lay knowledge, while in the process of their produc- 
tion they represent high-grade professional, science-based knowledge. 
Science and other forms of expert knowledge get into everyday life via 
technical things but, alas, in a very impoverished form. 
On the other hand, anticipations of the potentials, needs, resistances of 
the takers of technologies in many ways inform their making. Technologi- 
cal style, a concept much used in social constructivist approaches to 
technical change (see Bijker et al., 1987), is probably as much an outcome 
of anticipated user expectations as i t  reflects professional or organisatio- 
nal cultures of the makers of technologies, or the political interests of their 
regulators. 
Further elaborations of this aspect would require careful differentiation 
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of the temporal dimension of technisation, especially the distinction of 
“phylogenetic”, “ontogerietic” and “actual genetic” frames of reference. 
Irrespective however of temporal scale, there remains the basic issue of 
understanding the “arc of action” leading from making technical artefacts 
to their “freestanding” operation and back to taking them, the question of 
conceptualising the process of “reciprocation” and ‘‘leverage’’ taking 
place while going through the a rcg  
A change in perspective may be required here which abandons deeply 
entrenched notions of things as “media” of social exchange, at least for a 
time. Early advocates of a social science of things, like Graumann or 
Linde, began likening things to institutions or entities otherwise embody- 
ing action, but still somehow retain their medial character. Scarry’s notion 
of the “freestanding artifact” suggests another metaphor: that of things as 
social counterparts of social actors, whether personal or collective, 
exchange and indeed reciprocation taking place beteween these two 
parties. This is, incidentally, a perspective much closer to everyday life 
modes of experiencing things, whether in making them or taking them, 
namely as somehow sentient extensions of ourselves, capable of acting in 
unexpected ways and insistent on opening yet other cycles of recipro- 
cation. 
I do not want to advocate unduly the use of everyday life “construc- 
tions” of things as theoretical resource, and the notion of technical things 
as “subjective actors” should, for the time being, not be welcomed in 
social science discourse.” Still, the conceptual, language we choose, and 
their underlying “root metaphors” (Brown, xg77), cannot entirely be 
dissociated from everyday life worlds. 
THREE PERSPECTIVES ON CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND THE PROBLEM OF AN EMPI- 
RICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF EVERYDAY LIFE 
Up till now I have insisted that it does not matter much whether we 
conceptualise things in a Marxian, Durkheimian, Meadian, Garfinkelian, 
or even Skinnerean mood, as long as they are brought back to the fold and 
as long as i t  allows us to treat certain basic differences in the modes things 
represent actions: technical and non-technical, types of multiple and 
conflicting integrations, contexts of making and of taking. This can now be 
qualified by distinguishing three broad types of social scientific languages. 
One is general systems languages (GSL), that is, attempts to apply 
concepts derived largely from engineering sciences and biology to social 
processes and to use the cybernetic imagery that goes with them. 
A second type, which I will call mainstream languages (MSL), denotes 
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social psychological or sociological approaches which are reasonably 
empirical-analytic in orientation, but also reasonably aware of the inevita- 
bility of normative entanglements and the dialectic of social science and 
social process. 
A third type, denoted radical languages (RL), refers to critical 
approaches in psychology or sociology which are radical in the sense of 
professed partisanship or a conscious attempt to let social problems and 
constructions ‘out there’ be reflected in the concepts used. 
What I have introduced in the beginning as “problems arising from 
technology intruding in everyday life” will in GSL be considered as 
disequilibrium, tension, friction, dysfunction, maladaptation, with in-built 
assumptions that these can be brought under ‘rational control’ or that 
societies (sometimes personalities) are some kind of self-repairing sys- 
tems. In  RL it will be called crises, antagonisms, or simply idiosyncratic 
‘social constructions’, again with certain in-built assumptions from some 
philosophy of history or relativistic epistemology. 
What happens, when these types of languages are applied to the issue at 
hand by their proponents, is shown in the diagram. GSL are particularly 
adequate in describing the technology and technical integration aspects of 
the issue, RL are particularly apt in describing the everyday life parts of 
the issue. Both fail conspicuously in their opposite corners. 
G L  NS 1
TA + 
ELA - 
MSL 
H S 
( - 1  - ( + I  
( - 1  ( + I  + 
TA Technology Aspect NS  
GSL General Systems Languages 
ELA Everyday Life Aspect L 
MSL Mainstream Languages H 
RL Radical Languages S 
Natural Sciences 
Literature 
“Hard” 
“Soft” 
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MSL, i.e. mainstream traditions have a “feel” for both aspects and for 
the problem of interferences, but are not really coming to grips with both, 
especially because they are oblivious of the material-organismic 
components of social life. However, both in social psychology and in 
sociology two kinds of mainstreams may obviously be distinguished: 
“hard” approaches closer to GSL (denoted H in the diagram) and “soft” 
approaches closer to the radical-humanistic languages (denoted S).  In my 
view, these two sociologies and social psychologies do not really compete. 
They are not rival theories, but have different subject-matters: they select 
differently from the streams of life and consciousness. Some are more 
concerned with processes of organisation, control, instrumental action, 
cognitive structure (H) ;  others more with cultural values, affective pro- 
cesses, fantasy and imagination, ritual action (S) .  l h e  latter are somewhat 
better in capturing everyday life forms, the former in dealing with 
technology as one form of rationalized action. 
Over and above the general requirement to apply whatever social 
science language one uses to thc matcrial-organismic side of social life, 
there is then indeed a question of which conceptual language is more 
suitable and fruitful. I do not want to suggest a kind of “conceptual 
anything goes”, but rather, a certain amount of competition in the first 
place. I n  the second place, however, 1 want to suggest a kind of controlled, 
directed eclecticism. What we would clcarly like to have, in dealing with 
things, and particularly with tcchnical things in largely non-technical 
everyday life contexts, is a language which produces fat plusses (+) in both 
rows of the diagram. But I do not think this is possible within a unified 
conceptual scheme. 
The reason is that everyday life forms arc not in the same way capable of 
empirical reconstruction as highly formalizcd social processes. True, they 
can be analyzed and accounted for conccptually, that is in a language 
different and more powerful than the one used by evcryday life actors 
themselves ( L  in the diagram). But not in the samc nice and clean way as 
technical things are dcscribed in engineering concepts (NS) and as the 
formalised social processes can be described in the neat measurablc 
concepts of the harder social sciences. It is easier to reconstruct, empi- 
rically, monetary exchanges, legal relations and repetitive interactions 
with machinery, than to reconstruct everyday life activities. These are 
much denser, in the sense of combining and merging many possible forms 
of relating to things, to others and to oneself, and therefore tend to 
preclude description in the terms of specialist social sciences modeled on 
rationalised action. 
Indeed, there can be little doubt that the best studies of cveryday life 
forms are narrative rather than analytical in character, literary in style 
rather than systematic. Sometimes we comfort ourselves by saying that 
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they are qualitative in method. One somewhat disquieting conclusion 
from this is, then, that it will be very difficult to say anything very definite 
about what technology does to everyday life, as empirical scientists. 
I have begun by pointing out two implausible social futures and by 
saying that one process that is clearly emerging is the transformation of 
our everyday environments into complex ensembles of technical artifacts. 
I have assumed that this creates problems. And I have tried to argue that, 
in order to understand these problems, one must begin to take into 
account things conceptually, particularly technical things. 
To the extent that this argument is viable, putting it  into research 
praxis requires ignoring conceptual confines of academically codified 
discipline. The historical division of labor at the level of the production of 
knowledge, between disciplines like sociology and social psychology as 
well as between the social sciences generally and the other “sciences of the 
artificial” (Simon, 1981), has enabled modern societies to change into life 
forms which now escape analysis - if we stick to this regime. To 
paraphrase Gidden’s summing-up “new rule of sociological method” 
(1976, p. 162): If, as social scientists, we want to explicate the production 
and reproduction of modern society as the accomplished outcome of 
human agency, we must be able to explicate and mediate emergent forms 
of life, and their languages, within appropriate meta-languages of social 
sciences. 
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We might take things more] seriously. 
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NOTES 
’ See “The IHT’s Paris Conference: New Issue for a New Era”, International Herald 
Tribune, 2.5.1987. 
Gershuny is not centrally interested in technical change, and this may partially account 
for the “well-tempered computer” philosophy underlying much of his reasoning. He tends to 
ignore new forms of dependency on large formalized systems that come with new forms of 
household production, and generally distributional issues inherent in technological change. 
* 
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A more perceptive analysis, albeit again not focusing on technological matters, has been 
presented by Pahl (1984). 
See e.g. Homing, 1987, Joerges, 1987, Rammert, 1987, Weingart, 1987, Zapf et al., 1987, 
as well as other contributions in Lutz (1987) for a range of perspectives. 
The term is of course often used for whatever body of systematic instrumental 
knowledge, concerning all kinds of actions that can be organized in the form of precise, 
predictable means-ends-relationships, or, still more inclusively, all action organised accord- 
ing to rational principles. So one can talk about educational technologies, organisational 
technologies, social engineering etc. Indeed, most definitions of technology offered in social 
science literature explicitly state that the term technology, even in the sphere of material 
production, should not be mistaken for the material process and the machinery itself, but 
should refer to the “social” process surrounding machinery - as if machinery was not social. 
There are even books on technology where technology, in the sense of machinery, does not 
appear on a single page (e.g. Gouldner, 1976). 
No attempt is made to continue the unfortunate distinction of the terms “action” and 
“behaviour”, see Graumann (1980). 
The means-end terminology is less problematic for machine action than for human 
action, although still quite common in the philosophy of action (see e.g. HarrC, 1982). I t  
should be understood as a first approximation of the difficult distinction of practical or 
operative aspects of machinery and purely “textual” or symbolic properties of material 
artifacts (see, for a perspective elaborating the latter, Horning, 1985). 
For a representative collection see MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985). An exception is L. 
Winner’s “Do artifacts have politics?” (reprinted from 1980), answered with “yes”, albeit 
with few convincing examples and without a systematic attempt to clarify the “interior 
structure” of artifacts. The volume contains, however, splendid case studies relevant to this 
issue, particularly in its historical analyses of military technologies. 
See Graumann (1974) and with reference to G.H. Mead’s penetrating analyses of the 
social (intersubjective) aspects of thing constitution Joas (1980). 
Elaine Scarry (1985), who uses these terms in a way reminiscent of Arnold Gehlen’s 
anthropological concept of “Hundfungskreis”, has recently attempted a general theory of 
artifacts, both linguistic and material, technical and non-technical. 
Suggestions to conceptualise sophisticated technical machinery, prominently of course 
AI-machines, as “actors”, i.e. subjects, not objects of study (Woolgar), have cropped up 
recently in social constructivist contexts (see e.g. Woolgar, 1986 or Callon, 1987). R. Collins 
speaks about sociology’s decisive contribution to the ceration of a “computer that can think 
and talk like a human being” (1987, p. 134g), forseen by him on the basis of a new sociology of 
emotions (this quintessential domaine of a sociology of everyday life, BJ.) .  
’ 
’ 
l o  
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